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Abstract: This paper assesses the supposed dichotomies between Western and Asian perspectives on human 
rights and shows how such tensions are often false and should be rejected. Despite the deep flaws inherent in 
the “Asian values” approach, however, its ideology remains a powerful internal framework that continues to 
influence the political and judicial elite in Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia and Singapore. This is 
chiefly due to the lack of any competing theory regarding the conceptualization of human rights in the Asian 
context. The paper point out the gap in the jurisprudence in this area and concludes with some general 
observations on how to advance a model of rights protection to fill this lacuna.
*
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Theories of human rights over the past half-century have broadly appeared to perpetuate a rigid 
dichotomy between a universalistic conception of human rights and a relativistic approach. The 
former so-called “Western” model has been accused of advocating an individualistic approach to 
rights that prioritises the individual’s rights against society; by contrast, the “Asian values” 
approach emphasises social stability, privileging community and duties over the rights of the 
individual.  
  
Although the “Asian values” model propagated by Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s 
Lee Kuan Yew in the 1990s has been criticised as a construct used by authoritarian regimes 
to undermine civil liberties under the guise of maintaining political stability, little effort has been 
made to move beyond this stagnant approach regionally and to develop a more nuanced theory of 
human rights through a Southeast Asian lens.  The result is a lacuna in the jurisprudence dealing 
with the challenges of accommodating fundamental liberties within the constitutional framework 
of Southeast Asian countries, particularly Malaysia and Singapore.  
 
 Practical implications 
   
At present, faced with a seemingly stark choice between the two competing models, and powerful 
institutional constraints from the executive and legislature, courts in Malaysia and Singapore have 
instinctively viewed strong protection of individual rights as inappropriate for the local context.  
This has led to the undermining of individual civil liberties in cases where there appears to be 
a potential clash between communitarian interests and individual rights, such as liberty 
or religious freedom.  
   
One case study that illustrates this is the 2007 case of Lina Joy in Malaysia, which involved a 
Malay-Muslim woman trying to convert from Islam and have this officially recognised as her legal 
status in order to marry her Christian fiancé. The Federal Court—the highest appellate court in 
Malaysia—ruled that Muslims who wish to convert from Islam may not do so without a certificate 
of apostasy from the Sharia Court. As the Sharia Court — a religious forum by definition — has 
never issued such a certificate to any living Malay-Muslim in Malaysia,1 this creates a situation of 
practical impossibility for Muslims who wish to convert, despite the Article 11(1) constitutional 
guarantee of the right to “profess and practise” one’s religion.2  
  
                                                  
*
 A version of this paper was presented at the CGHR Research Group in February 2011, based in part on an early draft of 
a chapter of the author’s doctoral dissertation, which will be forthcoming as a book with Oxford University Press. For 
generous comments and thoughtful suggestions on this presentation, I thank Dr. Robert Weatherley and the participants 
at the Research Group. I am also deeply grateful to Professor Christopher Forysth, who has been an excellent source of 
guidance throughout the supervision of my doctoral dissertation. 
1
 Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Bar Council, Malaysia for Lina Joy [2007] 3 All Malay. Rep. 693 at 1. 
2
 MALAY. CONST., ART. 11(1). 
University of Cambridge · Centre of Governance and Human Rights · Working Paper 5  
Tew, Y., ‘Beyond “Asian Values”’, Nov. 2012  4 
The majority was clearly concerned about community stability and religious harmony. In the 
leading judgment, the Chief Justice reasoned that the effects of allowing apostates to convert out 
of Islam would be to cause “chaos among Muslims.”3 In the prior High Court decision, the judge 
had expressed similar sentiments, warning that it would “create chaos and confusion with the 
administrative authority” and “the Muslim community and the non-Muslim community as a 
whole.”4 The tenor of the judgments suggests that remnants of the “Asian values” paradigm 
continue to influence the jurisprudence of the Malaysian courts — the rights of the individual are 
still seen as secondary to societal stability.5  
  
In terms of executive action in Malaysia and Singapore, claims of national security also continue to 
be invoked by the government to justify the use of measures such as preventive detention law. 
The Internal Security Act (“ISA”) 1960 was used controversially in 2008 to detain an Opposition 
MP, a newspaper journalist, and online news editor, Raja Petra Kamarudin.6 The Home Minister’s 
defence of the arrests bears traces of the Mahathir Model ideology that “societal unity” must be 
prioritised at all cost.7 The Minister emphasised that “freedom without responsibilities has 
ramifications” and that the government did not want “anything that can threaten peace in the 
country.”8 Although Malaysia recently abolished its Internal Security Act in March 2012,9 it 
replaced it with the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, which has been criticised as 
“so widely defined so as to capture almost any form of conduct deemed undesirable by the 
powers that be.”10 
 
The way a country approaches ideas of human rights and its concept of individual rights protection 
underpins a nation’s political, legal, and social framework, with very real and concrete 
consequences for individuals.  
 
 
2. Themes Highlighting the Tension between Western and Asian Perspectives on Human 
Rights 
  
In this paper, I aim to provide an analysis of the so-called Western and non-Western models of 
human rights protection and to reassess these themes in light of contemporary developments 
both internationally and domestically. This paper is made up of two parts.  
  
The first part identifies the themes that highlight the supposed tension between Western and 
Asian perspectives on human rights. I evaluate the three main dichotomies in the debates: 
                                                  
3
 3 ALL MALAY. REP. 693 (2007) at 715 [13] (F.C.), 
4
 Lina Joy, 2 MALAY. L. J. 119 (2004), at 126 [10] (H.C.). 
5
 This narrow approach to constitutional interpretation is based on a tendency to view interpretation as an insular 
mechanism contained within the “four walls” of the domestic constitution without reference to international principles. 
This “four walls” approach was first articulated in Gov’t of Kelantan v Gov’t of Malaya 1 MALAY. L. J. 355, 359 (1963) 
(Thomson C.J.) (“[The Constitution] is primarily to be interpreted within its own four walls and not in the light of 
analogies drawn from other countries, such as Great Britain, the United States of America or Australia.”).  
6
 Raja Petra, Teresa Kok and Sin Chew reporter arrested under ISA, STAR (MALAY.), Sept, 13, 2008, 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/9/13/nation/2022362&sec=nation. 
7
 The government detained 106 persons, chiefly made up of those critical of the government, under Operasi Lalang, an 
internal security operation carried out in 1987 when Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was in power. Although Operasi 
Lalang was more widespread than this 2008 instance, the Home Minister uses similar rhetoric. On the Malaysian 
Internal Security Act generally, see RAIS YATIM, FREEDOM UNDER EXECUTIVE POWER IN MALAYSIA (1995). 
8
 Raja Petra, Teresa Kok and Sin Chew reporter arrested under ISA, supra note 8. 
9
 PM announces repeal of ISA, three Emergency proclamations, STAR (MALAY.), Sept. 15, 2011, 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/9/15/nation/20110915205714&sec=nation. 
10
 MALIK IMTIAZ, The Death of Civil Liberties, EDGE (MALAY.), Apr. 19, 2012, available at 
http://malikimtiaz.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/death-of-civil-liberties.html.  
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universalism versus relativism; individualism versus communitarianism; and, civil-political rights 
versus economic-social rights. I argue that these supposed dichotomies are false, unhelpful, and 
frequently obscure more than they illuminate.  
 
 Universalism versus relativism  
  
The first dichotomy between Western and Asian perspectives on rights is the supposed divide over 
whether rights are universal or culturally relative. One account views human rights as universally 
applicable to all human beings indiscriminately. Universalists view rights as natural concepts held 
simply by virtue of being human,11 or — the deliberative school of thought — as political values 
that come into existence through societal consensus and legitimisation.12 According to this view, 
human rights apply to all human beings everywhere, no matter which state or which culture one is 
from.  
 
Cultural relativism emerged as a reaction to the universal rights model. Relativists challenge the 
concept that rights are universal, arguing that rights are dependent on cultural norms and that 
human rights are not universally valid because they are the product of Western norms or — in a 
subtler form of the argument — that human rights need to be appropriate for, and accepted in, 
specific local contexts in order to politically legitimate.13 The “Asian values” ideology is a main 
example of cultural relativity. Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew viewed universal human rights as an 
alien imposition from the West, reflecting specific Western values, and argued for an approach 
based on “Asian values” instead.  
  
I am sceptical about cultural relativism for at least three reasons. The first is that using culture as 
the basis for relativism is deeply flawed to begin with. It is neither accurate nor meaningful to 
speak of an overarching homogenous concept of “Asian values” for a region as diverse as Asia, 
where cultural and religious norms, political history, and economic conditions differ between 
countries — and sometimes even within states.14 Besides differences based simply on ethnicity or 
religion, there are differences in culture between the different layers of society itself. Priorities and 
perceptions differ between the governmental elite and the public; between the urban middle class 
and the rural working class; between civil society activists and religious conservatives. Economic 
and social class are more important factors in determining one’s perceptions of rights than 
traditional “cultural” values.15  
  
Second, a related, but distinct, issue is that material bases and the state’s political power influence 
the conception and protection of rights more than culture.16 Economic progress is immensely 
significant in developing countries, like Malaysia and Singapore, and a stronger driving value 
                                                  
11
 See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 74 (2003). These universalists conceive of rights 
as given in the tradition of theorists such as Voltaire and John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
12
 Examples of scholars in this category include MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (2003); TOM 
CAMPBELL, RIGHTS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2006); Yash Ghai, Ch 3, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SOUTHERN VOICES 36, 104 (W. Twining ed., 
2009) [hereinafter SOUTHERN VOICES] (although Ghai believes such classifications are unhelpful in explaining his work, see 
id. at 219); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 221 
(2006). 
13
 The American Anthropological Association’s statement in response to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) is an example of one of the earliest formulations of the position on legitimacy of rights. See American 
Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights, in 49 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 543 (1947) (“The rights of 
Man in the Twentieth Century cannot be circumscribed by the standards of any single culture . . . .”). 
14
 Russell J. Dalton & Nhu-Ngoc T. Ong, Authority Orientations and Democratic Attitudes: A Test of the “Asian Values” 
Hypothesis, 6(2) JAP. J.  POL. SCI. 1, 20 (2005). 
15
 Yash Ghai, Ch 3, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SOUTHERN VOICES  (W. Twining ed., 2009), at 113-14. 
16
 Id. at 114. 
University of Cambridge · Centre of Governance and Human Rights · Working Paper 5  
Tew, Y., ‘Beyond “Asian Values”’, Nov. 2012  6 
behind government policies than culture or “Asian values”.17 The ruling parties’ apathy toward 
rights protection in Malaysia and Singapore and the authoritarian method of governance 
employed result from the executive’s continued monopoly of political power since independence, 
rather than a commitment to specific cultural values.  
 
Second, the cultural diversity, both ethnic and religious, across countries in Asia and even within 
countries themselves makes it difficult to claim that there is a single homogenous “culture” for a 
region as diverse as Asia. Besides differences based simply on ethnicity or religion, there are 
differences in culture between the different layers of society itself. Priorities and perceptions differ 
between the governmental elite and the public; between the urban middle class and the working 
class; between civil society activists and religious conservatives. Economic and social class are 
more important factors in determining one’s perception of rights as compared to traditional 
“cultural” values.18  
 
Third, relativists themselves lack clarity in using relativism as a conceptual argument. Emphasizing 
“Asian values”, such as the importance of family and community, does not preclude a society from 
acknowledging other “Western” rights-related values. If the argument is simply that some values 
are given greater priority than others, this is a matter of balancing competing values — an exercise 
commonly carried out in Western countries, for example through the concept of proportionality in 
the United Kingdom as an influence of the European Convention of Human Rights.19 This does not 
mean that values are relative from one culture to another; many Western European countries, for 
instance, are committed both to social discipline and liberal rights.20 
  
 Individualism versus communitarianism  
  
The second theme that emerges from the polemic between Western and non-Western human 
rights perspectives engages with the idea of individualism versus communitarianism. The 
supposed contrast between Western and Asian models of human rights lies in the perceived 
priority of the Western approach on an individual’s rights against society; by contrast, the Asian 
approach emphasises socio-political stability and duties over the rights of the individual.21  
  
The “Asian values” prong, which gained prominence in the 1990s in Southeast Asia, attempts to 
carve out its own “distinctive approach to human development and state-community individual 
relations” as “superior to the individualistic, rights-oriented Western democracies.”22 While there 
are some local particularities to the different models of “Asian values” in various Asia Pacific 
countries, all variations have a strong emphasis on neo-conservative communitarian values and 
social order, and is frequently used to justify state intervention.23 In the words of Lee Kuan Yew: 
“Asia has never valued the individual over society. The society has always been more important 
than the individual.”24 
  
                                                  
17
 Laurence Wai-Teng Leong, From “Asian Values” to Singapore Exceptionalism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A REASSESSMENT OF 
THE ASIAN VALUES DEBATE 134 (L. Avonius & D. Kingsbury eds., 2008). 
18
 Yash Ghai, Ch 3, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SOUTHERN VOICES  (W. Twining ed., 2009), at 113-14. 
19
 See, generally, H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 305-14 (10
th
 ed., 2009). 
20
 Michael Freeman, Human rights, democracy and ‘Asian values’, PACIFIC REV. 352, 356 (1996). 
21
 See DONNELLY, supra note 14, at 107-123. See also Li-Ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: 
‘Promises to keep and miles to go before I sleep, 2 Yale Hum. Rts. and Dev. L. J. 1, 13-22 (1999) 
22
 Thio, id., at 22. 
23
 Michael Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 109, 128 (1998). 
24
 Sandra Burton, Society vs The Individual, TIME, June 14, 1993, at 20-21.  
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Again I argue that this dichotomy is conceptually flawed. First, it is artificial to ascribe rights-
related values as Western and community-related values as Asian. Values related to order and the 
importance of the family or community are not important only to Asian communities. The debate 
between the priority placed on societal order versus individual rights is also a source of tension 
between the conservatives and liberals in the West. Emphasis on individualism also varies 
according to different Western political cultures. The United States, for instance, has a greater 
emphasis on individualism compared to other Western European countries.25 
  
Second, I am sceptical of the claim that “Asian values”, with its priority on the society over the 
individual, is necessary to ensure community and political stability. Taking away from individual 
liberties does not necessarily lead to an increase in community stability.  Indeed, I argue that an 
inverse relation between prioritising the rights of the individual and social tension more accurately 
depicts the challenges of dealing with a multicultural and multireligious society. An approach that 
focuses on community rights, rather than an individual’s right, inevitably runs into sensitive issues 
of appearing to prefer one community’s rights over the others. The tension between the Malay-
Muslim community and the non-Muslim community in Malaysia over the Lina Joy decision on 
apostasy illustrates this.26  
  
 Economic priority and “Asian values”  
  
The emergence of the “Asian values” paradigm is closely linked to the economic success of 
Southeast Asia in the 1990s before the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The main thrust of the economic 
priority argument made by Asian states is that economic development must be given precedence 
over civil and political rights. Developing countries argue that they cannot afford the “luxury” of 
civil and political rights which developed countries can because of their economic prosperity. 
Governments in Malaysia, Singapore and China argue that economic development is the main 
priority for developing countries, and that strong authoritarian governance is needed in order to 
steer their countries in this direction. 
  
This debate is frequently framed as a tension between economic and social rights versus civil and 
political rights, with Asian states prioritising the former and Western states prioritising the latter. I 
am sceptical with this framing of the debate. First, such a dichotomy presupposes an entirely 
economic and narrow definition of development. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen shows that that 
“development involves much more than mere economic growth.”27 Development must be 
understood as a “process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” and human rights are 
a constituent element of this.28 To approach economic and social rights as separate from civil and 
political rights is based on the misunderstanding that both sets of rights are mutually exclusive and 
that priority must be given to one at the expense of the other. This view is blinkered: “economic 
and civil liberties are inter-related and inter-dependent.”29 
   
Second, the emphasis of developing countries is really on economic priority, in terms of GDP 
growth or output, rather than on the fair distribution of economic opportunities to all individuals.30 
This dimension is highlighted by the constitutionally protected privileges of the Malay ethnic 
majority in Malaysia.31 This is used as the basis of a national economic policy that effectively forms 
                                                  
25
 Michael Freeman, Human Rights, democracy and ‘Asian values’, PACIFIC REV. 352 (1996), at 355. 
26
 Lina Joy, 3 ALL MALAY. REP. 693. 
27
 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, 93 (1999). 
28
 Id. at 3 (1999). 
29
 Michael Kirby, Human Rights and Economic Development, 22 JOURNAL OF MAL. & COMP. L.  1, 16 (1995). 
30
 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 111 (2003).  
31
 FED. CONST. (MALAY.), art 153. 
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an affirmative action regime in favour of the majority Malay group for government positions, 
scholarships, business contracts and so forth – a policy that has caused increasing resentment 
among other communities and “reinforces ethnic and class communities”.32 The Chinese, Indians, 
and other ethnic minorities do not receive an equal distribution of such rights, raising the question 
of whether economic and social opportunities are indeed available for all citizens.   
 
 
3. Beyond “Asian Values”: Reassessment of the Themes 
  
The second part of this paper reassesses the themes identified in the first part of this paper in light 
of developments since the 1990s in human rights discourse. In particular, I look at whether — and 
to what extent — there has been a movement away from the “Asian values” approach after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis. 
 
The discourse on human rights in Asia has both an external and an internal component. The 
external component refers to the “Asian values” debate as part of the international human rights 
discourse on theories of rights protection and economic development. I reassess the external 
contribution of “Asian values” to the international dialogue after the 1997 financial crisis: how 
have the debates surrounding universalism and relativism evolved since the 1990s and in what 
direction is the current international human rights discourse heading?  
  
The internal component, which is distinguished from the external debates regarding human rights, 
relates to the immediate and practical issue of whether remnants of the “Asian values” ideology 
continues to have an impact internally within the Asian states. In this section, I assess whether 
“Asian values” continues to have an influence domestically within societies in the countries that 
were particularly forceful in propagating the ideology like Malaysia and Singapore. 
   
 External and Internal approaches to “Asian values”  
 
Externally, on an international level, the “Asian values” approach has evolved through several 
stages.33 The concept of “Asian values” first emerged on the international human rights discourse 
in the 1990s in a highly political manner. The term was conceived by Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew 
and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohammad, gained momentum through China’s White Paper on Human 
Rights in 1991, and achieved the support of other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
states in the 1993 ASEAN Bangkok Declaration. The debates on “Asian values” at this stage were 
heavily politicised and polemic, with “Western” universalists and “Asian” cultural relativists having 
diametrically polarised points of view. The 1997 Asian financial crisis dealt a crippling blow to 
Southeast Asian states that had previously argued “from a position of economic and social 
success.”34  
    
Despite pronouncements by detractors of “Asian values” that the debate was over,35 a second 
wave to the “Asian values” debate arose after the 1997 crisis. In this second stage, the discourse 
was no longer dominated by politicians, but by scholars. As a result, the debates became less 
                                                  
32
 Ghai, in TWINING ED., at 143. Bumiputera, literally translated, means “sons of the land”. It is used to refer to the Malays, 
who form the ethnic majority group, and other indigenous ethnic groups, such as the Orang Asli, Ibans, Kadazans, etc. 
33
 For discussion of the various rounds of the “Asian values” debate, see Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and 
Relativism: The Evolving Debates about “Values in Asia”, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2003-2004). 
34
 Competitive Order, ECONOMIST, Feb 15, 1992, at 58-59. 
35
 See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Asian Values in the Wake of the Asian Crisis, in DEMOCRACY, MARKET ECONOMICS & 
DEVELOPMENT: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 151 (F. Iqbal & J. You eds, 2001) (“Since few people today seem to be interested in 
making the case for Asian values…criticizing the concept may seem a bit like beating a dead horse.”).  
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politicised and more academic.36 The “Asian values” debate moved beyond sharp dichotomies, 
such as universalism versus relativism or individualism versus communitarianism, toward 
achieving more balanced viewpoints. There has been increasing recognition of the need to 
accommodate competing tensions by focusing on how to make rights more culturally legitimate 
and toward achieving cross-cultural global consensus on such rights. 
  
So, what next for the Asian rights discourse? I believe that the “Asian values” concept is useful not 
because of any intrinsic substance but because of the gap that it highlights, although ultimately 
fails to fulfil: the lack in the international human rights discourse of a localised Asian perspective of 
rights.  
 
I argue that the third and final stage, then, must be to develop a comprehensive theory that draws 
together the strands that have emerged from the discourse into a distinctive Asian model. As 
Peerenboom notes, “the debates over Asian values, Confucianism, and communitarian 
alternatives to liberalism have suffered from the lack of a systematic, coherent theory…”37 The 
next stage should attempt to find a synthesized Asian model that attempts to accommodate these 
tensions in a politically sensitive manner for specific local contexts in Southeast Asia.  
  
This external outward facing approach of Asian rights discourse should not be confused with the 
internal inward-looking impact of “Asian values” domestically. The internal approach to “Asian 
values” is inward-looking: focused on the internal experience of the Southeast Asian countries 
after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Detractors of “Asian values” view the approach as 
internationally discredited after the financial crisis, but the separate question of whether this has 
undermined its internal domestic impact remains. Although “Asian values” is no longer a buzzword 
in the Southeast Asian region, I assess the extent to which remnants of the “Asian values” ideology 
continues to operate within the states that had been its strongest proponents—Malaysia and 
Singapore.  
  
The continuing impact of the “Asian values” ideology needs to be distinguished according to its 
influence on two separate layers of society. The first layer of society encompasses actors 
responsible for shaping the state’s domestic policy: government leaders, politicians, and judges. 
The second layer consists of the public or the citizenry.  
  
 Remnants of the “Asian Values” ideology: Two layers of society  
  
Remnants of the “Asian Values” ideology can still be found in Malaysia and Singapore in the 
institutions that constitute the first layer—the government and the courts. Although terms like 
cultural relativism and “Asian Values” are not used anymore, the ideology itself still remains: these 
governments remain extremely protective of their right to determine their own approach toward 
human rights and economic development.  
 
In Malaysia, the spectre of the racial riots of May 13, 1969, and claims of national security 
continue to be invoked to justify the continued use of measures, such as the preventive detention 
law, which has been criticised for being abused to silence dissenters. The Home Minister’s defence 
of the 2008 arrests, discussed above, of an Opposition politician, journalist and online newspaper 
editor, bears traces of the Mahathir Model ideology that “societal unity” must be prioritised at all 
costs,38 and that “we do not want anything that can threaten peace in the country.”39  
                                                  
36
 Peerenboom, supra note 33, at 52. 
37
 Id. at 84. 
38
 Operasi Lalang, an internal security operation, was carried out under then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 
1987, where 106 persons, chiefly comprising those critical of the government, were detained.  
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The “1Malaysia” concept of the current Prime Minister, Najib Razak, with its emphasis on unity 
and mutual respect, also remains very much in line with the Mahathir Model’s emphasis on social 
order and economic progress. Prime Minister Najib himself stressed that 1Malaysia was “not a 
new concept” and that its “ultimate objective of national unity was the main vision of past 
leaders”.40  The continued emphasis on economic development is also clear in the 1Malaysia 
concept: Najib called 1Malaysia a “continuation of the agenda of nation-building” 41 and has taken 
steps to liberalise the financial services sector by removing the previous requirement for 
companies to reserve at least 30% equity for Malay investors. 
  
Najib’s 1Malaysia campaign has been criticised by Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister 
and current Opposition figure, as a cosmetic attempt by the new premier to win back ethnic 
minority voters after the ruling party’s disappointing performance in the 2008 general elections.42 
Also, although Najib’s economic liberalisation is a step in the right direction, he has steered away 
from dealing with Malaysia’s clear economic elephant in the room: the affirmative action policy 
for the bumiputera majority.43  
  
Across the border from Malaysia, Singapore exhibits characteristics that have been called an 
“‘Asian values’ redux.”44 The key principles of the “Asian values” approach—its emphasis on 
cultural determinism, social order, and a restrictive approach to liberal rights—are present in a 
“different format”. 45 Lawrence Leong uses the term “Singapore Exceptionalism”, adapted from 
the concept of “American Exceptionalism”, to describe the ruling elite’s prevailing view that 
Singapore’s unique circumstances and economic success allows it to determine its own method of 
governance and its approach to international human rights standards.46 The state continues to be 
fiercely defensive of its own view of what works for Singapore; the Ministry of Home Affairs was 
clear that “what works” is “stable, effective government”—not “any abstract ideal of liberal 
rights”.47 
  
The courts in Malaysia and Singapore continue to be highly deferential toward the executive in 
matters relating to restrictions on fundamental liberties, despite the framework of 
constitutional—not parliamentary—supremacy.  In Chee Siok Chin v. Minister of Home Affairs,48 
the Singapore High Court emphasised that “[s]tandards set down in one country cannot be 
blindly… and/or applied without a proper appreciation of context” because there are “greatly 
varying value judgments as to what may be tolerable or acceptable in different and diverse 
                                                                                                                                         
39
 Raja Petra, Teresa Kok and Sin Chew reporter arrested under ISA, STAR (MALAYSIA), Sept, 13, 2008, 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/9/13/nation/2022362&sec=nation 
40
 Bernama, National unity ultimate objective of 1Malaysia, says Najib, BERNAMA, June 15, 2009, 
http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=418020. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Anwar trains his sights on 1Malaysia, MALAY. INSIDER, Apr. 30, 2009, http://anwaribrahimblog.com/2009/04/30/anwar-
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societies.”49 The experience of Malaysia and Singapore show that while the “Asian values” thesis 
may have been dismissed internationally, its internal impact from both the executive and judiciary 
should not be underestimated.  
  
 Second layer of society: Who speaks for whom? 
  
The political elite and the adjudicators — the first layer of society — continue to perpetuate 
familiar claims that societal and economic stability necessarily require priority over individuals. But 
to what extent do these claims legitimately represent the position of the people who make up the 
other layer of society? During the 1990s, rapid economic growth and strong leadership under 
Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew led many citizens to accept “the government’s claims that the rights 
of the individual were incompatible with, and secondary to, community interests.”50 This has 
changed over the past decade. Political participation among the second layer of society has 
increased, particularly in Malaysia. 
  
The controversial sacking of Anwar Ibrahim as Deputy Prime Minister, and his subsequent 
detention and trial for alleged sodomy charges, was a key event in politicising the middle class in 
Malaysia. The growth of new media, such as online independent news portals, blogs, and Twitter, 
has also played an immense role in the articulation of dissatisfaction with the status quo and 
mainstream media. These factors culminated in an unprecedented outcome in the March 2008 
general elections when the National Front ruling coalition lost its two-third parliamentary majority 
and lost five out of the thirteen state governments to the Opposition coalition led by Anwar 
Ibrahim.51  
  
The changing face of the second layer of society in Malaysia and Singapore — more revolutionary 
in the former and evolutionary in the latter — throws the two layers of society into stark contrast: 
it has become increasingly clear that it is no longer easy for the ruling elite to claim that it speaks 
for society as a whole. The political reality of the 21st century requires a more legitimate and 
developed theory of constitutional adjudication that acknowledges the voices of the second layer 
of society.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
  
The external and internal approaches point towards the need for a more developed and nuanced 
model of rights protection for Malaysia, which moves beyond the remnants of the “Asian values” 
ideology but which remains firmly locally contextualised. In conclusion, I advance three main 
theses regarding the direction in which an inclusive model of human rights for Asia should move.  
  
First, the way forward for a contextual Asian model is to build on cross-cultural theories of human 
rights.52 Approaches like Abdullah An-Na’im’s that focus on broadening universal consensus of 
rights through cross-cultural dialogue are realistic in recognising that rights require political 
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legitimacy to be accepted in different cultural contexts.53 But while intercultural approaches 
should form the foundation on which rights protection in Southeast Asia should be based, I believe 
in going further than An-Na’im. The problem with An-Na’im’s focus on cultural legitimation 
through dialogue, even for existing international human rights standards, is it follows that cross-
cultural analysis may lead to these standards being revised.54 I argue that there is a sufficient 
cultural legitimation of international standards, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
for certain core human rights to be regarded as universal because of the common consensus 
surrounding them. 
  
Second, we need to be sceptical of framing tensions between supposed competing interests—and 
that we should move beyond such dichotomies definitively. The suggestion that an individual’s 
autonomy has always to be balanced against the society’s need for protection against the harms 
of such liberties requires scrutiny. The individual-community dichotomy can also be framed as a 
balance between liberty and security—an image that has become increasingly topical in the West 
after September 11, 2001. Jeremy Waldron challenges this perceived “balance” and argues that 
detracting from one does not necessarily enhance the other—so, a diminution in liberty may not 
in fact have the desired consequence of an increase in security.55 Indeed, I argue that prioritising 
communitarian concerns to maintain social cohesion by adopting a restrictive approach to 
individual liberties frequently leads to inverse effects for social stability. Decisions like Lina Joy,56 
with its emphasis on the group concerns of the Muslim community rather than the individual’s 
right to religious freedom, ultimately results in increased polarization between the Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities in Malaysia.  
  
My third, and final, thesis is that a rights-based approach should be constructed in a manner that 
is specifically sensitive to the local context for which it is meant to apply. This is so that the model 
is uniquely tailored to take into account the specific circumstances that Asian governments claim 
pose different challenges from Western states. Such a model needs to be developed from the 
Asian perspective in order to be able to substantiate its claim that it is developed for Asian 
contexts and to avoid post-colonial governments sensitive to any suggestion of neo-imperialism 
perceiving it as simply another form of Western imposition.57 Such an approach needs to be 
culturally sensitive—but not culturally relative. In moving beyond the “Asian values” approach, a 
more nuanced and politically realistic model of rights protection is needed for these countries to 
function as an internal constitutional framework.  
  
Development of these strands in a careful and thoughtful manner into a balanced 
conceptualisation of rights from an Asian perspective will be a significant step forward in 
advancing rights protection in Malaysia and Singapore. The “Asian values” ideology is theoretically 
unfounded and politically outmoded. It is time for a fresh perspective and definitive move toward 
a more sophisticated model that can better encapsulate contemporary political realities and guide 
a more sensitive balancing of interests in regional human rights protection. 
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